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Arbitration is a voluntary method of alternative dispute resolution that is used to
settle contract and related disputes, including disputesbetween private parties arising
under statutes. The use of arbitration has been burgeoning in recent years. In 2002, for
example, the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), only one of the many providers
of arbitration services to disputants, handled 230,255 cases.1 Arbitration, however, is
controversial when used to settle employment and consumer disputes.2 Critics call such
arbitration “mandatory arbitration” because agreements to arbitrate often are contained in
adhesion contracts that, the critics say, leave the employee or consumer no choice but to
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agree to arbitration.3 The critics apparently believe that arbitration provides second-class
resolutions of such disputes to the prejudice of employees and consumers. Many
advocate that arbitration should be banned or limited in these cases, leaving a party free
to resort to litigation despite its agreement to arbitrate.4
Many courts appear to be among the critics despite proclamations by the United
States Supreme Court that there is a statutorily-based federal policy – applicable
throughout the full range of the Commerce Clause, in state and federal courts alike –
favoring arbitration. In many cases, mostly decided since 2000, these courts refuse to
enforce arbitration agreements by finding them unconscionable under state contract law.5
They give a wide range of reasons for such a conclusion. The net effect of these decisions
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is to provide unprecedented judicial review of arbitration agreements for judiciallyperceived reasonableness or fairness, not unconscionability.6
This Article’s thesis is that these courts have gone too far, often failing to follow
the applicable law as enunciated in federal pre-emption cases by the United States
Supreme Court or as encompassed by state contract law. It affirms that there are cases in
which an arbitration agreement should not be enforced because it is unconscionable under
generally applicable state contract law. It suggests, however, that many judicial refusals
to enforce are based on clearly erroneous reasons. It is hard to resist the conclusion that
many courts are hostile to arbitration,7 as were courts until passage of the United States
Arbitration Act in 1925 (generally known as the “Federal Arbitration Act” or “FAA”). 8
According to the Supreme Court, the point of that legislation was to end judicial
hostility.9 The Supreme Court has found in the FAA a strong federal policy favoring
arbitration. It has held that state laws contrary to this policy are pre-empted.
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Part I of this Article sketches the basics of arbitration law and practice and traces
the development of the federal policy favoring arbitration – to establish a basis for
evaluating contemporary judicial decisions. Part II examines the justification for the
policy favoring arbitration and the reasons contracting parties may prefer arbitration. Part
III evaluates the reasons courts give for finding arbitration agreements in employment
and consumer contexts unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. The conclusion is
that many courts make many clearly erroneous decisions, including decisions that are or
should be pre-empted, manifesting a new judicial hostility to arbitration.
I. Arbitration Law and Practice
A. The Arbitration Process
Arbitration is a matter of contract: There can be no valid arbitration without the
disputing parties’ agreement.10 Most often, the parties agree to arbitrate as part of a
“container contract” providing for a substantive exchange and containing an arbitration
clause. These agreements are known as “pre-dispute” arbitration agreements.11 When
concluding pre-dispute agreements, however, the parties – or at least the weaker party –
may not think about the kinds of disputes that may arise or the procedures to be employed
to settle them. For employees and consumers, even reading a pre-dispute arbitration
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clause – which is rare – may not produce much understanding.12 Lawyers representing
such parties usually are not involved at this stage.
In the typical cases considered for this Article, a dispute arises between an
employee or consumer, on one hand, and an employer or retail seller, on the other. The
weaker party – one of the former – is the one aggrieved by an alleged breach of contract
or a violation of a statute applicable in a contractual relationship. The weaker party files a
lawsuit in a court. At least in federal court, the stronger party files motions under the
FAA to compel arbitration and to stay litigation.13 Following argument, and a factual
hearing in some cases, the court denies these motions, thereby refusing to enforce the
arbitration agreement. A lawsuit presumably follows.
When the court enforces the arbitration agreement, the claimant may file a
“demand” for arbitration – in most cases with an arbitration services provider such as the
AAA, as set forth in the agreement and the service provider’s rules.14 The respondent will
receive a copy of the demand and file an answer.15 The parties will proceed to select their
arbitrator or arbitrators, who need not be lawyers but may be experts in the relevant
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field.16 If the parties cannot agree, the service provider or a court will appoint the
arbitrator.17 The arbitrator, after hearing the parties, will adopt a procedure for the
arbitration, in accordance with the arbitration agreement. In a case with large stakes, he
or she may decide upon requests from the parties, require discovery as appears
appropriate in the case, receive pre-trial summaries of the parties’ cases, and conduct a
hearing on the merits.18 Following the hearing, the arbitrator may or may not receive
post-hearing submissions. He will decide the case and issue an award. A victorious party
can move a court to confirm the award and enter it as a judgment of the court.19 It then
must be recognized and enforced the same extent as would be a judicial judgment. In all
cases, the arbitration is governed primarily by the arbitration agreement and any
arbitration rules incorporated therein. The costs of the arbitration, including the
arbitrator’s fee, are borne by the parties, as agreed in the arbitration agreement or as the
arbitrator may decide.20
Arbitrations greatly vary from one to another. When the stakes are small, the
arbitration will be brief and simple, taking only a few hours, by telephone or in person,
short-circuiting the extensive procedures employed in litigation (outside of small claims

16

Though arbitration tribunals may consist of one or more arbitrators, this Article will encompass in

“arbitrator” tribunals with more than one member.
17

FAA § 5; e.g., AAA Supplementary Procedures, supra note 14, at Rule C-4; AAA National Rules, supra

note 14, at Rule 12b.
18

Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Commercial Arbitration Rules, Rules R-1, R-20 to -35 (effective Sept. 15, 2005),

http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 [hereinafter AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules].
19

FAA §§ 9-10, 13.

20

AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 18, at Rule R-50.

7
court). Even when the stakes are large, the arbitration will be tailored to the dispute.
Generally speaking, claims will not be dismissed nor summary judgment granted prior to
a hearing on the merits. There may be little or no discovery or discovery limited to
documents only. A hearing on the merits dispenses with the rules of evidence. There is no
jury in arbitration.21
If something goes seriously wrong in the arbitration process, there is a judicial
remedy. Courts may be called on to confirm an award.22 The losing party may seek to
vacate the award.23 The FAA specifies the grounds for vacating an award. They are:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.24
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In some jurisdictions, an award may be vacated, in addition, when the arbitrator
manifestly disregarded the law.25 Vacating an award, however, is unusual; it is not the
result of a robust appeal.
B. The Old Judicial Hostility
Recourse to arbitration was common in medieval England and seems to have been
favored by the courts. In 1608, however, Lord Coke’s influential dictum in Vynior’s
Case26 began a trend toward judicial disfavor, at least with respect to the enforceability of
pre-dispute arbitration agreements. In that case, Robert Vynior brought an action in debt
against William Wilde on a bond of twenty pounds. Wilde’s commitment under the bond
was to observe and perform the arbitral award of a named arbitrator who had the
authority by the parties’ agreement “to rule, order, adjudge, arbitrate, and finally
determine all Matters, Suits, Controversies, Debates, Griefs and Contentions” as
described. Coke gave judgment on the bond for Vynior, but in dicta observed that a party
could countermand his obligation to arbitrate. He reasoned, oddly, that to decide
otherwise would be to make “not countermandable, which is by the law and of its own
nature countermandable.”27 He also analogized the arbitration agreement to powers of
attorney or the provisions of a last will and testament, which were and are revocable.
Hostility to arbitration agreements evolved from Vynior’s Case into a contest
between arbitration and the judiciary. In 1749, a plaintiff brought an action on an
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insurance policy and the defendant defended on the basis of the arbitration clause in the
policy. The court gave judgment for the plaintiff because “the agreement of the parties [to
arbitrate] cannot oust this court” of jurisdiction.28 The idea that an agreement to arbitrate
ousts the courts of jurisdiction was influential in England until the Arbitration Act of
1889.29 That act provided that a submission, unless it expressed a contrary intention, was
irrevocable and had the same effect as if made by court order. It also made the first stab
at rules of law which would facilitate the conduct of an arbitration, such as the
appointment of arbitrators when the parties failed to do so, empowering arbitrators to
summon witnesses and examine them under oath, making awards final, and empowering
arbitrators to award costs. In England, then, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements, but it had largely evaporated by the turn of the
twentieth century.
The history in England had a large effect on nineteenth century judicial attitudes
toward arbitration in the United States. Before 1920, the United States courts tended to
enforce arbitral awards rendered before a judicial proceeding was commenced unless the
arbitration was a product of collusion to defraud a third party.30 Agreements to arbitrate,
however, were another matter. Nineteenth century courts “simply assumed that such
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clauses were revocable and non-enforceable.”31 Thus, in 1874, the Supreme Court
announced a principle of the non-enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future disputes.
“Every citizen,” the Court wrote, “is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and
to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford him.”32 In a
civil case, a party “may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration, or
to the decision of a single judge,” but a party “cannot . . . bind himself in advance by an
agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and
on all occasions.”33 The precedents, the Court reasoned, show that “agreements in
advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.”34
C. Advent of the Policy Favoring Arbitration
Statutory reforms, first in New York and then at the federal level, radically
changed the law governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements. In New York, a
group of reformers sought to ease the judiciary’s burden by fostering arbitration. In 1923,
a leader of the reform movement stated its goals as follows:
a. To reduce the cost to the consumer, without taking it out of the
producer.
b. To reduce the law’s delay and consequently what amounts virtually to
a denial of justice.
c. To save time, trouble and money to disputants, the law office, and the
state.
d. To preserve business friendships.
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e. [Arbitration] is voluntary. No one need agree to arbitrate unless it is
his wish.35
To accomplish these goals, the reformers sought foremost to reverse the rule holding
arbitration agreements “revocable.” The 1920 New York arbitration statute provided that
a written contract to settle an existing or future dispute was “valid,enforceable and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”36 Courts were authorized to make orders directing arbitration to proceed as
provided in the contract or submission37 and to appoint arbitrators if the parties failed to
do so.38 Moreover, the courts could stay litigation that was inconsistent with an
arbitration agreement.39
The reformers proceeded to campaign for reform on the federal level. In 1925,
Congress enacted the FAA.40 Like the New York statute, the FAA mandates the
enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”41 Courts can stay judicial
proceedings and compel arbitration.42 Courts can appoint arbitrators when necessary.43
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Motions for stays or to compel litigation are made and heard as motions,44 obviating the
need for complaints or other court filings. Arbitrators are empowered to issue subpoenas
for evidence from parties and nonparties alike.45 Courts were empowered to confirm
valid awards or vacate awards that were infirm by the statutory criteria.46
Even so, the old judicial hostility persisted. In Wilko v. Swan,47 in 1953, the
Supreme Court found that arbitration was substantive in its implications because it was
an inferior form of dispute resolution for important substantive claims. Wilko was
overruled in this regard in 1989.48
The beginning of the Supreme Court’s shift was in 1967. In Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,49 the Court eliminated any powerful judicial role in
supervising arbitration agreements. The claim was one of fraud in the inducement of a
contract containing an agreement to arbitrate disputes that arose out of or related to the
contract or a breach thereof. The issue before the Court was whether a claim of fraud in
the inducement of the entire contract is to be resolved by the court in which a stay of
litigation is sought, or, rather, should be referred to the arbitrators.
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had taken the view that, as a matter
of federal substantive law, arbitration clauses are “separable” from the contracts in which
they are embedded; hence, when no claim was made that fraud was directed to the
arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause would commit the question of fraud in
the container contract to the arbitrators.50 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, by
contrast, had taken the view that the question of “severability” should be decided as a
matter of state law; where a state regards arbitration clauses as inseparable from the
remainder of the agreement, the question of fraud would be for the courts.51 The Second
Circuit’s view was upheld. The FAA, as interpreted, deprived the courts of a device that
otherwise could be used to keep cases away from arbitrators.
Any doubt that the Supreme Court’s attitude had changed became difficult to
maintain after three decisions in the 1980s. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Const. Corp.,52 the Court announced that there was a federal policy favoring
arbitration. The issue involved arbitrability, this time a claim that one party to an
arbitration agreement had “lost any right to arbitration under the contract due to waiver,
laches, estoppel, and failure to make a timely demand for arbitration.”53 First, the Court
read Prima Paint to manifest a policy of the FAA to require “a liberal reading of

50
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arbitration agreements” so that, for example, “some issues that might be thought relevant
to arbitrability are themselves arbitrable.”54 Second, it announced that
[q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal
policy favoring arbitration. . . . The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of
the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.55
Then, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,56 the Court wrote that, in enacting FAA § 2,
“Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration [for disputes within the
Commerce Clause] and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for
the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”57
In 1985, the court decided Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc,58
which involved the arbitrability of antitrust claims advanced under the Sherman Act and
within a valid arbitration clause in an international contract. The court of appeals had
reasoned that “the pervasive public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the
nature of the claims that arise in such cases, combine to make . . . antitrust claims . . .
inappropriate for arbitration.”59 The Court found no “explicit” support for such an
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exception in either the Sherman Act or the FAA.60 It held that antitrust claims were
arbitrable, at least when arising from an international transaction. Since Mitsubishi, a
series of decisions has expanded the realm of arbitrable disputes to encompass such
statutory claims as those arising under the federal securities law,61 RICO,62 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act,63 and Title VII employment disputes.64 Following
Mitsubishi, the Court appears to assume that, if Congress intended a statute’s substantive
protection to include protection from waiving a judicial forum, “that intention will be
deducible from text or legislative history.”65
The policy favoring arbitration should be taken seriously. This policy reaches by
far the lion’s share of contractual transactions within the United States, so long as they

60
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affect interstate commerce.66 The policy pre-empts inconsistent state laws.67 Through the
FAA § 2, it is applicable in state courts.68 In light of the burgeoning number of cases
brought to arbitration, arbitration might be in the process of replacing litigation as the
primary method of compulsory dispute settlement for contract and related civil cases.
II. Justifications for the Policy Favoring Arbitration
A. Justifications
That the Supreme Court adheres to a strong policy favoring arbitration does not
mean that there should be such a policy. One normative reason, however, supports such a
conclusion.69 It is freedom of contract, premised on the value of party autonomy.
Moreover, the parties may wish to enter an arbitration agreement for three reasons. First,
the parties themselves may with to balance accuracy of results, procedural fairness, and

66
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adjudicative efficiency differently from the way the courts do it in civil litigation. The
second is arbitration’s capacity to serve as an alternative to a slow and sometimes
terrifying civil litigation system.The third is the value of allowing parties to balance
accuracy of results against the finality of decisions, also doing it differently from the way
the courts do it. On the whole, it should be concluded, the Supreme Court’s policy is
reasonable.
1. Freedom of Contract: Party Autonomy
In principle, allowing contract parties to agree to settle disputes by arbitration
enhances party autonomy. It expands freedom of contract by allowing parties to contract
out of civil litigation, making litigation a default method of settling disputes.70 With an
arbitration alternative, parties are not faced with a choice between litigation and nothing
(insofar as compulsory methods of dispute resolution are concerned). They have the
alternatives of litigation, arbitration or nothing. By contrast with litigation, arbitration is
highly flexible. The parties can fashion the procedure as best suits their needs. Hence,
arbitration empowers people to better control their own destinies.
Most of the cases reviewed for this Article involve adhesion contracts containing
arbitration clauses. Adhesion contracts are standard form contracts drafted and “imposed”
by a strong party on another with less bargaining power. Negotiations over the preprinted terms – those that are not added to the form, such as the price term – are not

70
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allowed. The weaker party rarely reads or understands the pre-printed terms.71
Sometimes, important terms are in fine print or obscure language that discourages
understanding.72 Adhesion contracts are ubiquitous in the American economy. One
scholar suggests that ninety-nine percent of contracts entered into in the United States are
adhesion contracts.73
It has been argued that the party autonomy rationale does not reach adhesion
contracts.74 The weaker party cannot negotiate the pre-printed terms. Assent to the
arbitration clause is not subjectively present because that party normally does not read or
understand those terms.75 For practical purposes, however, the general scholarly debate
on adhesion contracts is beside the point. Under the Supreme Court’s arbitration
decisions, adhesion contracts containing arbitration clauses cannot be treated differently
from adhesion contracts generally.76 Because adhesion contracts, including the fine print,
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generally are enforced,77 the arbitration clauses must be enforced unless they are
unenforceable for other reasons.
As a normative matter, moreover, it can be argued that adhesion contracts
generally should be enforced. One reason is that, it has been suggested, the relevant
subjective assent is present because the weaker party signs the form contract normally
knowing that there are terms in that they do not understand. Those parties nonetheless
intend to be bound by all of the terms of the contract.78 Indeed, it would be unreasonable
and unworkable to require that each party subjectively assent to each term in a form
contract. In part for the same reason, moreover, a reasonable person in the stronger
party’s position would understand that the weaker party assented to the contract and that
all of the terms bind both parties. According to the objective theory of contract, the
weaker party therefore is bound.79
There are three further reasons supporting the objective theory in this context.
First, the objective theory generally is employed for other contract formation issues and
for purposes of interpretation.80 It would be incoherent to employ the subjective theory
only for adhesion contracts or adhesion contracts containing arbitration agreements.
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Second, the objective theory protects the stronger party’s reliance interest, as does
modern contract law.81 Third, as has long been understood, there are many good reasons
for the stronger party to employ form contracts and to refuse to negotiate the pre-printed
terms. Form contracts are, in a word, efficient.82 There is reason to believe that arbitration
clauses lower the contract price of the goods, services or money, or provide weaker
parties with more advantageous terms, because arbitration reduces the parties’ joint costs
of contracting.83
2. Procedural Fairness, Efficiency and Accuracy
In a throwback to Wilko v. Swan,84 the principal concern of contemporary courts
seems to be that a weaker party’s contract or related rights may not be effectively
vindicated in an arbitration proceeding.85 (We should assume that this attitude does not
reflect a pro-employee, pro-consumer–pro-claimant–bias because that would be
indefensible when structuring procedures.) There is, however, no evidence that
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arbitration is worse than litigation at achieving accuracy of results. What little empirical
work we have suggests that arbitrators decide cases much as judges do, and with less
cognitive distortion than juries suffer from.86 Juries in some parts of the country might be
more pro-employee and pro-consumer than arbitrators, but this is speculative and
irrelevant.87 Arbitration might in fact be more effective than litigation at achieving
accuracy of results. There are normally no pre-trial substantive motions, discovery wars,
antiquated rules of evidence or juries allowing clever advocates to skew the results. In
addition, even when operating at its best, the civil litigation system must be assumed to
reach inaccurate results in some cases.
Even if there is not better accuracy of results in arbitration, the parties should be
empowered to trade off their interests in procedural fairness and efficiency, on one hand,
and accuracy of results, on the other, by streamlining and tailoring their procedure to the
needs of the case. Typically, there is no practice involving delays due to motions to
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dismiss, summary judgments, and directed verdicts. Rather, proceedings tend to go
directly to a hearing on the merits. Consequently, arbitration is often quicker and cheaper
for the parties than litigation, even after the costs and fees are taken into account. (Of
course, an arbitration can go wrong and be even slower and more expensive than
litigation.)
The civil litigation system has a one-size-fits-all procedure in each jurisdiction
(except in small claims courts), embodied in generally applicable procedural rules. It
balances these policies in one way, sacrificing procedural fairness and accuracy in some
cases in the name of judicial efficiency. For example, consider the availability of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.88 At this stage, a court must balance a
plaintiff’s interest in his or her day in court against judicial efficiency. It is inefficient to
spend resources on meritless claims. However, some dismissals will be mistakes, and
everyone knows it. The litigation system is prepared to sacrifice some degree of accuracy
in the interests of fairness to the defendant and judicial efficiency. The parties should be
able to tailor their procedure to their case, balancing procedural fairness, efficiency and
accuracy of results differently from the way the litigation system does it. Because there
are no pre-hearing dismissals or extensive discovery, arbitration may be capable of doing
a better job at balancing these values in the parties’ interests.
Commercial parties very often find arbitration sufficiently fair, efficient and
accurate. They commonly contract out of litigation by concluding arbitration
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agreements.89 Almost no one criticizes the arbitration alternative for commercial cases.90
By analogy and inference from the commercial practice, there is no reason to presume
that arbitration practice is too unfair, inefficient or inaccurate for noncommercial parties.
3. Alternative to a Crippled Civil Litigation System
Not everyone thinks the American litigation system does a good job. Among the
criticisms are those aimed at lengthy delays due to crowded dockets, discovery wars,
arcane rules of evidence and the obsolescence of jury trials in civil cases.91 These features
of American litigation, and others, raise the parties’ costs so that many cases are not
worth filing. Trials, moreover, are becoming far less prevalent as judges engage in
managerial judging and helping the parties to negotiate settlements.92
Arbitration generally dispenses with these troublesome features. In particular,
hearings are almost always held; arbitrators do not mediate cases. Parties consequently
may be more likely to get a “day in court.” For those who want out of litigation, the
arbitration alternative should be available. There will still be cases in which the costs of
arbitration exceed the amount of a claim or otherwise discourage proceeding. There is
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every reason to believe that this happens less in arbitration than in civil litigation,
especially for consumer and employment claims.93
Arbitration is especially important in international commercial cases. Foreign
recognition of United States judgments is difficult, reflecting other countries’ disdain for
the American civil litigation system. Their courts and commentators object to the very
same features of litigation that arbitration typically dispenses with. It is therefore
reasonable for American parties, like so many foreigners, to find litigation unappealing.
Because this is reasonable, courts should not insist that employees and consumers resort
to litigation as their sole process.
5. Finality of Awards
In practice, courts vacate few arbitral awards. Judicial scrutiny here falls well
short of that involved in judicial appellate practice.94 But the absence of a robust appeal
in arbitration is one of its attractions to many parties. Arbitration law balances the finality
of awards against the greater accuracy appeals might generate. It finds finality to be of
greater value.
The civil litigation system, too, balances finality against accuracy. It sometimes
finds finality of greater value. Consider, for example, the courts’ refusal to relitigate a
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case when asked to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment.95 The parties should be able
to bring themselves under arbitration law’s balance by agreeing to do so. The balance of
finality and accuracy in arbitration is reasonable even if different from that of the civil
litigation system. There is nothing sacred about a right to a robust appeal.
B. Scope of the Policy Favoring Arbitration
Consider the FAA § 2, the source of the federal policy favoring arbitration:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.96
The Supreme Court has held that the savings clause of this statute requires that arbitration
agreements in transactions affecting interstate commerce be enforced on an equal footing
with other contracts under state contract law.97
In five cases, the Court has struck down state laws that discriminated against
arbitration.98 In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,99 for example, the Alabama
legislature had enacted a statute making written, pre-dispute arbitration agreements
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invalid and unenforceable.100 The Court held it unconstitutional because pre-empted by
the FAA § 2. In Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto,101 the Montana legislature had enacted
a statute requiring arbitration clauses to be underlined and on the first page of a contract.
Montana’s contract law did not require contract clauses generally to be written this
way.102 The legislation, therefore, treated arbitration agreements less favorably than
general contract law would. The Supreme Court held that the Montana statute was
unconstitutional because pre-empted by the FAA § 2.103
The question raised by this Article is whether courts are free, under these cases
and general principle, to find an arbitration agreement unconscionable when the court’s
reasons for such a finding disfavor arbitration. On the one hand, the justification for such
a finding is based in general contract law – the unconscionability doctrine. On the other,
however, the reasons and consequences may be incompatible with the federal policy
favoring arbitration. Existing case law does not resolve this tension. The courts should
hold that the FAA § 2 pre-empts judicial holdings that disfavor arbitration even if the
legal basis for the decision is the unconscionability doctrine.
In dicta, the Supreme Court has given conflicting, if not confusing, guidance. In
Perry v. Thomas,104 the Court said:
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Thus state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law
arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of
contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the
fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement
of [FAA § 2]. [citation omitted] A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of
litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner
different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements
under state law. Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be
unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what we hold today the
state legislature cannot.105
This passage makes it clear that FAA § 2 can pre-empt a judicial “holding.” Moreover,
the last sentence of the passage would seem to say that, even if the legal basis of the
judicial holding is the unconscionability doctrine, FAA § 2 nonetheless may pre-empta
judicial holding if it disfavors arbitration.
Further Supreme Court dictum is more confusing. In Allied-Bruce Terminix, the
court wrote:
In any event, § 2 gives States a method for protecting consumers against unfair
pressure to agree to a contract with an unwanted arbitration provision. States may
regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law
principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause “upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” . . . What States may
not do is to decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all of its basic terms
(price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The
Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place
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arbitration clauses on an unequal “footing,” directly contrary to the Act’s
language and Congress’ intent.106
The first two sentences of this passage say that states may hold arbitration agreements
unconscionable under generally applicable state contract law. The last two sentences,
however, qualify this position significantly. The penultimate sentence says in effect that
the arbitration clause should be evaluated in the context of the whole contract. The
contract, including its arbitration clause, rises or falls on the basis of fairness as a unity.
This contradicts the second sentence, which says that states may regulate arbitration
clauses, seemingly singling them out for analysis under the unconscionability doctrine.
Because support can be found for both positions in Supreme Court dicta, we
should consider what, given existing law, the Court should hold if an appropriate case
were before them. Consider a hypothetical case: A state supreme court holds that all
written, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate are unenforceable because unconscionable.
There is a similarity to and two distinctions between this case and Allied-Bruce Terminix.
First, the substance of the hypothetical holding is identical to that of the Alabamastatute
in Allied-Bruce Terminix. Second, the decision was made by a court, not a legislature.
Perry is clearly correct that a court should not be able to do what a legislature cannot. A
court can undermine the relevant federal policy as effectively as does a legislature
because the consequences are the same. The fact that the hypothetical case involves state
law “of judicial origin” makes no difference. Third, the hypothetical state court based its
decision on a doctrine of general contract law. For the same reason, this should make no
difference. The consequences undermine the relevant federal policy as effectively as

106

115 S.Ct. at 843.

29
would legislation without a contract law basis. The hypothetical case cannot be
distinguished meaningfully from Allied-Bruce Terminix.
It might be argued that the basis of the hypothetical holding makes a significant
difference. The unconscionability doctrine is a doctrine of general contract law and, it
might be argued, falls within the savings clause of FAA § 2: “save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”107 Unconscionability, it might
be argued, is a “ground” for the revocation of any contract. Such a conceptual argument,
however, is not persuasive. The statute should not be read to manifest a “strong” federal
policy favoring arbitration, which pre-empts contrary state laws, but to allow contrary
state laws that rest on a doctrine of contract law. State laws and judicial holdings with
contrary consequences for the federal policy should be pre-empted whatever their legal
garb. The holding in the hypothetical case puts arbitration agreements on an unequal
footing with other contracts and should be pre-empted.
No court has made such a broad holding as that in the above hypothetical case.
Rather, as will be seen in the next Part of this Article, the courts proceed in a piecemeal
fashion, striking arbitration agreements down one case at a time due to “unconscionable”
features of each particular clause. The courts should not be able to do piecemeal what
they could not do in one stroke.
III. Unconscionability and Arbitration Agreements
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A synthesis of the cases reviewed for this Article indicates that, since 2000, many
courts have been refusing to enforce arbitration agreements.108 The usual ground for such
refusals is unconscionability.109 These decisions, however, often misuse the
unconscionability doctrine, qualified by the policy favoring arbitration as required by
federal law.110 They focus on reasonableness or fairness standards. These are not the
unconscionability standards in general contract law. Using these vague standards results
in treating arbitration agreements less favorably than other contracts, a result that is preempted by the FAA.111 In addition, the relevant courts use the civil litigation system as
the standard, striking arbitration agreements that are not equal to it procedurally.112 This
favors litigation over arbitration, depriving parties of the advantages of arbitration and
violating the federal policy favoring arbitration. It is hard to resist the conclusion that
there is a new judicial hostility to arbitration in noncommercial cases.113
A. Unconscionability
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Courts may strike down arbitration agreements when they are unconscionable
under general contract law. As a matter of contract law, however, the unconscionability
doctrine is not a license for courts to police agreements for reasonableness or fairness. To
find a contract or contract provision unconscionable, a court must find that it is both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.114 Procedural unconscionability consists
in an absence of meaningful choice on the part of a party with grossly weaker bargaining
power.115 Substantive unconscionability consists of a “gross disparity in the values
exchanged.”116 Note that the tests require gross disparities in the making of the contract
and in its substantive terms. It is sometimes said that the contract or term must be
“harsh,” “oppressive,” and “shock the conscience” to justify a finding of
unconscionability.117
The phrases "harsh," "oppressive," and "shock the conscience" are not
synonymous with "unreasonable." Basing an unconscionability determination on
the reasonableness of a contract provision would inject an inappropriate level of
judicial subjectivity into the analysis. With a concept as nebulous as
“unconscionability” it is important that courts not be thrust in the paternalistic role
of intervening to change contractual terms that the parties have agreed to merely
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because the court believes the terms are unreasonable. The terms must shock the
conscience.118
The doctrine, moreover, allows the stronger party to show that the contract or term, even
if grossly unfair, is justified by business needs. If so, the term is upheld.119 In addition,
an unconscionable term can be severed from the remainder of the contract if the
unconscionability does not pervade the contract.120 Apart from the cases involving
arbitration agreements, the courts do not often strike down an agreement or term for
being unconscionable.
Finding arbitration agreements unconscionable consequently does not violate the
FAA § 2 or its policy favoring arbitration per se. An arbitration agreement that appears
not to allow the effective vindication of a claimant’s (or respondent’s) rights might
appear to be unconscionable per se. But, as indicated above, it should be up to the parties
to decide whether and how to trade off accuracy, on the one hand, and procedural
fairness, finality and efficiency, on the other.121 The courts often ignore the latter side of
the balance. Moreover, the cases do not present themselves in such terms. Rather, an
arbitration agreement may have a particular feature or combination of features that
contribute(s) to a court’s conclusion that the agreement is unconscionable and
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unenforceable. For example, it may be an adhesion contract, limit discovery, or allow the
employer to litigate while the employee must arbitrate. Not every feature that
disadvantages a claimant, however, is a valid reason to hold that the agreement is
unconscionable.122 That depends on a closer examination of the court’s reasoning in the
case.
There are three major additional reasons for closely scrutinizing judicial reasoning
in this context. First, as indicated by Doctor’s Associates, a finding of unconscionability
must not single out arbitration for different treatment than that afforded by contract law
generally. In contract law, it is rare for a court to declare an agreement unconscionable
simply because of perceived unreasonableness or unfairness. The policy of contractual
freedom requires deference to the parties’ value judgments, even when they are not the
judgments the judge would make or approve of. Second, the unconscionability doctrine
requires the courts to consider whether there is a special business need that justifies the
questioned provision.123 When there is, the agreement is not unconscionable. Third, a
court should take into account the policy favoring arbitration when deciding the
unconscionability question. More important, the mere fact that an arbitration proceeding
will differ from litigation is not a legitimate reason for striking down an arbitration
agreement. It is one of the great advantages of arbitration generally that the parties may
simplify and tailor the arbitration proceeding to their case. The policy favoring arbitration
should be given the effect of requiring due respect for such advantages over litigation.
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Consider a case holding that an arbitration clause is unconscionable because it
lacks “mutuality:”124 The employee must arbitrate while the employer may litigate.125
Such a holding fails for all three reasons. First, it singles out arbitration for special
treatment. If there is consideration, there is no requirement of “mutuality” in contract law
generally.126 If there were, it would view the contract as a whole when deciding the
question, not the arbitration provision in isolation.127 Second, there may be a special
business need that justifies the provision. In employment relationships, for example, the
employer may need access to the courts to obtain a quick preliminary injunction to
prevent an employee from divulging trade secrets or competing in violation of a covenant
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not to compete.128 Empanelling an arbitral tribunal would take too long, and the tribunal
may not have the power to issue preliminary injunctions.129 Third, the policy favoring
arbitration argues against unconscionability in such cases. The inference is irresistible
that such a holding is premised on a belief that the employee is disadvantaged by having
to arbitrate while the employer is advantaged because it can litigate, irrespective of the
particular features of the arbitration. Supposing that the employee is thus disadvantaged
supposes that arbitration is inferior to litigation. Such a supposition violates the policy
favoring arbitration.
B. Armendariz and the Effective
Vindication of Statutory Claims
Before turning to an evaluation of judicial decisions finding arbitration
agreements unconscionable, a different issue should be distinguished. In Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,130 the U.S. Supreme Court held that claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act131 are arbitrable, continuing its line of cases holding
that claims under statutes are arbitrable.132 It did not hold, however, that wherever an
employee has concluded an arbitration agreement such claims must be arbitrated
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regardless of the characteristics of the arbitration.133 Recognizing the public interest in
statutory claims, the court indicated that the arbitration agreement must provide for the
“effective vindication of statutory rights.”134 It did not state the minimum conditions
under which statutory rights could be effectively vindicated in arbitration.
The California Supreme Court stated such conditions in the leading case of
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.135 Two employees had
brought an action against their employer under California’s Fair Employment and
Housing Act.136 Their contract of employment, however, contained an arbitration clause.
The employer moved to compel arbitration. The court refused to enforce the “mandatory”
arbitration agreement on both effective vindication and unconscionability grounds. With
respect to effective vindication, the court stated four conditions: (1) the arbitrator must
be neutral; (2) the arbitration agreement must provide for adequate discovery; (3) the
arbitration agreement must require the arbitrator to make a written award to permit a
limited form of judicial review; and (4) the employer must bear the costs of the
arbitration insofar as they have no parallel in litigation (such as the arbitrator’s fee).
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Gilmer’s and Armendariz’s effective vindication rationale, it should be
emphasized, is applicable only to arbitration of statutory claims.137 It has its basis in the
policy of the statute under which the claim is brought, not contract law.138
Unconscionability is a matter of contract law and forms a separate basis for invalidating
an arbitration agreement. This Article is concerned only with unconscionability.
Nonetheless, as in Armendariz, many courts employ the unconscionability doctrine to
invalidate agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. This Article takes these cases into
account in the following evaluation. Because of the separate effective vindication
rationale for statutory cases, an agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim should be held
unconscionable under contract law only if the same agreement to arbitrate a common law
claim also would be unconscionable.
C. Judicial Treatment of Arbitration Agreements
As indicated, many courts are striking down pre-dispute arbitration agreements in
noncommercial cases on the ground that they are unconscionable. They find these
agreements procedurally unconscionable simply because they are parts of adhesion
contracts: A stronger party presents them to a weaker party in a standard form contract on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis, not allowing negotiations over the arbitration term. They find
such agreements substantively unconscionable for a host of reasons. Few of these
reasons, however, hold up under close scrutiny, though there are cases in which a finding
of unconscionability is justified. From this, one may easily infer that there is a new
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hostility to arbitration.
1. Procedural Unconscionability
Many arbitration agreements contained in adhesion contracts will be found in
contracts between stronger and weaker parties. Such contracts are generally
enforceable.139 “[T]here is a central theme that runs through the . . . law . . . : contracts of
adhesion, like negotiated contracts, are prima facie enforceable as written.”140 Respected
scholars criticize this law. They advocate, for example, that contracts of adhesion be
considered prima facie unenforceable and reviewable for fairness.141 Notably, many
courts have adopted substantially the scholar’s view in recent cases involving arbitration
agreements. These courts hold that adhesion contracts containing arbitration clauses are
per se procedurally unconscionable, but usually that substantive unconscionability is also
required to render the contract unenforceable.142 There is something audacious in
asserting that perhaps 99% of the contracts made in the United States are procedurally
unconscionable (or prima facie unenforceable).143 Indeed, clearly, the courts are not so
holding. A business, moreover, should be able to decide the terms on which it will do
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business – and they normally do in many respects.144 Consider, for example, a firm that
offers cars only with two-year limited warrantees. It offers the warrantee term on a takeit-or-leave-it basis with no negotiations allowed, and it does not make extended
warrantees available for an additional price. It would be absurd to find that the contract or
the warrantee term is procedurally unconscionable for this reason. If the salesman does
not mention the limited warrantee and the consumer does not ask, there is no subjective
consent to the specificclause when the consumer signs the contract so providing. Again,
however, it would be absurd to consider the contract procedurally unconscionable for this
reason. Procedural unconscionability requires exceptional pressure by the stronger party
against the weaker one.145
Adhesion contracts containing arbitration clauses are being singled out from the
general run of adhesion contracts cases decided in recent years.146 This is a problem
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under Doctor’s Associates:147 The FAA § 2 requires that arbitration agreements be treated
on the same footing as other contracts. Laws treating them differently are pre- empted.148
Evidently, the courts are hostile to arbitration because they accord less respect to
arbitration agreements in employment and consumer contracts than to contracts
generally.149 Such hostility is exactly what the FAA § 2 seeks to end.150
Consider four cases. In one, the court may hold that an arbitration agreement in an
adhesion contract was procedurally unconscionable (in part) because the arbitration
clause was in fine print or otherwise inconspicuous.151 This holding is inconsistent with
Doctor’s Associates. Even terms in fine print generally are enforced.152 In a second, the
court finds procedural unconscionability because the stronger party did not explain to the
weaker party what rights it was forgoing.153 Even when an employer gave an explanation,

arbitration clause, by contrast, provides an alternate procedure for vindicating rights. The analogy is
inadequate to save the arbitration cases considered here.
147
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one court held that there was procedural unconscionability.154 Again, this is incompatible
with general contract law, which imposes a duty on each party to read a contract and to
seek legal advice if necessary.155 Perhaps, even with an explanation, few consumers and
employees would understand the implications of agreeing to arbitration, or care. In a
fourth case, the court found procedural unconscionability despite the fact that it was a
post-dispute agreement, was not a contract of adhesion, and the weaker party was
represented by counsel. This decision is almost certainly unprecedented in contract and
arbitration law. Even strong critics of arbitration would enforce post-dispute arbitration
agreements, and the presence of a lawyer is significant.156 The courts’ hostility to
arbitration is clear.157
In addition, many cases find procedural unconscionability because there were no
negotiations on the arbitration clause,158 or that the weaker party had no alternative
source for the employment or goods to be provided by the stronger party.159 There is,
however, no requirement in general contract law that there be give-and-take in the
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negotiation of a contract or each clause of a contract. Requiring such a negotiation
defeats the value of form contracts, which require uniformity to serve their many
purposes.160 It appears that these requirements are being imposed only on arbitration
agreements, in violation of Doctor’s Associates. There is also no requirement in general
contract law that a contract be held unenforceable because a weaker party had no
alternative source of supply.161 Antitrust law is available to address the problem of
monopolies. Otherwise, there are usually competitive alternatives. In any event, there is
and should be no common law legal guarantee that an employee can get a job, much less
a particular job, or that a consumer can buy a particular product. One case even held that
an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because a consumer had no
choice but to agree to arbitration if it was to borrow from the lender.162 The availability of
other lenders was not even considered.
2. Substantive Unconscionability
Even if one were to accept that arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts are
procedurally unconscionable per se, one must proceed to considersubstantive
unconscionability. In almost all jurisdictions, both procedural and substantive
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unconscionability are required to justify finding that a contract is unenforceable.163 In the
recent cases examined for this Article, the courts have given over twenty different
reasons for finding an arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable in an
employment, consumer or similar case. For the reasons given below, it is hard to resist
the conclusion that many of these cases manifest a new judicial hostility to arbitration.
a. Costs and Fees
In arbitration, one party bears or both parties share the costs of the arbitration,
including the arbitrator’s fee and any filing fee. It is possible to shift a winning party’s
lawyer’s fees to the losing party. The arbitration agreement may address the question of
costs and fees or, more often, the arbitrator may decide it.164 Unlike civil litigation, there
is no governmental revenue source to subsidize the proceeding. The lesser cost of
arbitration on the whole is due mainly to the absence of pre-trial motions, extensive
discovery and from lower lawyer’s fees that result from a streamlined procedure. The
U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that prohibitively expensive fees may be grounds
for invalidating an arbitration agreement in a case involving a statute.165 Some courts cite
costs and fees as a reason to hold that an arbitration agreement is substantively
unconscionable in nonstatutory cases, too.166 One court focused on the agreement’s
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requirement that the parties bear their own lawyer’s fees.167 Another found that the costs
and fees would be greater than the amount of a consumer’s claim.168 Others hold that
sharing costs would discourage claimants from bringing claims.169 A fourth wrote simply
that arbitration would be expensive,170 and four more that arbitration would be more
expensive than a lawsuit.171 Yet others have disapproved of imposing lawyers’ fees on
the losing party,172 even when this is left up to the arbitrator.173 And a seventh held that a
consumer-claimant could not be required to pay any part of the arbitrator’s fee.174
Upon critical scrutiny, holding that these features render an arbitration agreement
substantively unconscionable is inconsistent with the policy favoring arbitration. The
high costs of litigating, notably attorney’s fees and the costs of pre-trial motions and
discovery, frequently discourage potential plaintiffs from bringing claims in court.175
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These costs generally are cheaper in arbitration though the parties must pay filing fees
and the arbitrator’s fee. There is no basis for finding that arbitration, on the whole, is
more expensive than litigation. Accordingly, the costs rationale for finding
unconscionability may be based on false premises. In any event, it fails to distinguish
arbitration from litigation while preferring litigation as a standard for judging arbitration
agreements. Consequently, it is incompatible with the policy favoring arbitration.
An agreement that imposes costs and/or fees on the losing party may be
conscionable, even if not the best arrangement. Such an agreement does not deter an
employee or consumer from bringing weak claims any more than it deters a respondent
from defending (i.e., not settling) on the basis of weak defenses. It is fair in this basic
respect. Several statutes, moreover, allow a court to award costs and fees to the victorious
party.176 Foreign practice, as in England, routinely involves shifting lawyer’s fees.177 And
respected scholars advocate fee shifting in the United States.178 True, an employer or
seller may be better able to afford the costs and fees; consequently, some weaker
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employee and consumer claims may be discouraged by the prospect. But, again, the costs
of litigation discourage plaintiffs, too. The rationale does not distinguish arbitration from
litigation while preferring litigation. Consequently, it violates the policy favoring
arbitration.
O’Donoghue v. Smythe, Cramer Co.,179 illustrates a case in which a court rightly
found a costs provision unconscionable. The arbitration agreement limited the claimant’s
recovery to $265. The minimum cost of the arbitration to the claimant would have been a
$500 arbitration filing fee.
In addition, it is easy to sever a provision providing for onerous costs and fees,
leaving the remaining questions to the arbitrator and the arbitration obligation intact.180
Most courts that rely on these reasons, however, do not consider severance. Yet
severance of an unconscionable term is permitted explicitly under the standard
formulations of the unconscionability doctrine.181 Moreover, it would seem to be required
whenever possible by the policy favoring arbitration. This should be an additional,
independent and sufficient reason to sever. By not severing when it is possible, the courts
strike down entire arbitration agreements for inadequate reasons. The costs and fees seem
a pretext for doing so. Hostility to arbitration may be inferred.
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b.

Procedural Limitations: Venue, Limitation Periods, Class Actions,
Consolidation, and Discovery
Many courts strike arbitration agreements because the procedure specified in the

agreement appears to them to be unfair to the employee or consumer, often because
arbitration would be less favorable than litigation. Again, when designing a procedure,
the defendant/respondent’s interests also should be taken into account. Accuracy of
results – not plai ntiff/claimant’s victories – should be the goal. Five procedural elements
stand out in the cases. The rationales offered here, too, mostly are questionable in light of
the policy favoring arbitration.
First, some cases hold that it is substantively unconscionable for an agreement to
require that the arbitration be located far from the employee’s or consumer’s home.182
Presumably, this discourages the weaker parties from bringing claims. The same thing,
however, is true in the litigation context. Parties normally are free to select their litigation
forum by agreement, even in adhesion contracts.183 There is no apparent reason why they
should not be similarly free in arbitration. Moreover, on this issue it is again permissible
to sever an offending clause from the remainder of the agreement.184 A location provision
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seems easy to excise.185 But some of these courts did not sever the location provision;
rather, they refused to enforce the entire arbitration agreement.186 The courts might be
manifesting a pro-plaintiff bias, but (yet again) this in itself would be unjustified. The
location rationale, absent severance, would seem questionable enough to be inconsistent
with the policy favoring arbitration.
Second, some litigated arbitration agreements set short deadlines for filing claims
in arbitration – shorter than the applicable statute of limitations. Courts have held
arbitration agreements containing such deadlines to be substantively unconscionable.187
The problem with these clauses is real, but they should not be held unconscionable so as
to destroy the entire arbitration agreement. The refusal to enforce them should be based
on the public policy underlying the relevant statute of limitations. The offending deadline
should be severed.188 As with the costs and location cases, impermissible limitations
provisions do not make the entire arbitration agreement unconscionable. The policy
favoring arbitration would seem in such a case to mandate severance.
Third, classwide arbitration generally is permissible.189 Some arbitration

185

Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); see Great Earth Cos., Inc. v.

Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 890-91 (6th Cir. 2002). These cases put severability on the ground that it was the
parties’ intentions that the clause could be severed.
186

Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165; Patterson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563.

187

Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2003). A ten day notice-of-claim-

requirement was struck down in Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2001).
188

See Swain, 128 S.W.3d 103.

189

See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 1539 U.S. 444 (2003). See generally Joshua S. Lipshutz, Note,

The Court’s Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent Course at the Juncture of Mandatory Arbitration

49
agreements, however, prohibit it and are, for this reason, held unconscionable.190 This
prohibition works to the disadvantage of very small claimants, whose claims are not
viable for arbitration unless combined with many others. In this respect, arbitration within
such an agreement would seem to be inferior to the litigation alternative, especially when
the claim may be brought in small claims court.191 But, again, such a comparison is
beside the point due to the policy favoring arbitration. Litigation does not set the
standard. Rather, the question is whether the prohibition makes out a “gross disparity in
the values exchanged”192 – a contractual analysis of substantive unconscionability as
permitted by the FAA § 2. The parties should be free to trade off any discouragement of
claims with the advantages of arbitration.
Moreover, the basis for striking down this clause is the statute or procedural rule
allowing class actions. The clause therefore may violate public policy. Again, the clause
can be severed because its unconscionability, if any, does not pervade the arbitration
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agreement.193 Failing to sever it, as some courts have, may seize on a pretext to disfavor
arbitration.
Fourth, at least one court has refused to enforce an arbitration agreement in part
due to a prohibition on consolidating claims.194 In litigation, joinder may be permissible
or even mandatory.195 Again, there is a difference between arbitration and litigation. But
the comparison again is beside the point of a sound unconscionability analysis; litigation
does not set the standard. In addition, consolidation generally is not allowed in arbitration
unless all parties agree to the same arbitration.196 By prohibiting consolidation in an
arbitration agreement, the stronger party simply signals that it will not agree to a
consolidated arbitration.197 The clause in effect exercises a right under the law. It does not
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disadvantage the weaker party. Using a prohibition on consolidation to refuse
enforcement of an arbitration agreement seems like a thin pretext to hide an antiarbitration bias. Again, such a provision could be severed.
Fifth, some arbitration agreements limit discovery; for example, they may allow
each party no more than two depositions.198 The absence of discovery or limited
discovery can be one of arbitration’s virtues because it streamlines the proceeding,
reducing delay and costs. If enforced, however, a discovery limitation can work, for
example, to the disadvantage of an employee asserting a claim of discrimination under a
civil rights statute. Consider such a claim based on a statistical argument.199 The
employer will have possession of the relevant data. For a claim of harassment, by
contrast, the testimony of the employee may suffice. Under Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.,200 the discovery limit probably need not be enforced when it denies an
avenue for the effective vindication of statutory rights.201 In a nonstatutory case, such as
one for breach of contract by discharging an employee without cause, effective
vindication may not be so hampered, if it is relevant.202 No public policy underlying a
statute is in play; the right in question is a private right.203 Nonetheless, ideally, the extent
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of discovery should be decided by the arbitrator in light of the shape of the case and the
parties’ arguments in order to provide a fair hearing – not in the arbitration agreement ex
ante. In some – but not all – cases, a limit on discovery may be substantively
unconscionable.204 Yet again, it can be severed.
c. Unilateral Rights for the Stronger Party
Some cases strike down arbitration clauses because they allow the stronger party
to change the terms unilaterally. For example, a stronger party may be given a right to
modify the arbitration agreement.205 Similarly, it may provide for the arbitrator to be
selected by one party or from a list provided by one party.206 Some of these limitations
are substantively unconscionable. In particular, the arbitrator surely should be a neutral.
Allowing the stronger party to name the arbitrator in the arbitration agreement, or to
provide a list from which the arbitrator must be chosen, so destroys the integrity of the
arbitral proceeding as to “shock the conscience.”
A unilateral right to modify the arbitration agreement is subject to the legal
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limitation that it must be exercised in good faith.207 The arbitration agreement confers
discretion on the stronger party. This discretion must be exercised for a reason that was
reasonably expectable by the weaker party at the time of contract formation.208 The good
faith limitation on discretion probably does what unconscionability cannot do: It requires
the stronger party with a unilateral right to modify to establish and maintain fair arbitral
procedures.209 Under this law, however, the question cannot be decided on the basis of
the initial arbitration agreement – the one containing the right to modify. It should be
decided on the basis of the agreement as modified by the stronger party. Only then can it
be determined whether the modification was made in good faith. On the whole, however,
though these decisions ignore the good faith check, it cannot be said that they exhibit
hostility to arbitration.
d. Substantive Limitations
Some courts have seized upon substantive limitations on the arbitrators, contained
in the arbitration clause, as reasons to strike down the arbitration agreement. In some
cases, the arbitration agreement limited the remedy the arbitrator could award, excluding
consequential or punitive damages.210 In one, the agreement imposed a penalty on the
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weaker party for failing to arbitrate a claim.211 These are substantive matters. They have
nothing to do with the arbitration procedure. Limiting a remedy is allowable under
contract law because the law of contract remedies generally consists of default rules. It is
even permissible under statutes such as RICO.212 The substantive question may turn on
whether the remedy as limited fails of its essential purpose or is an unconscionable
term.213 Unless it does, the limitation is effective in litigation as well as arbitration.214 It
therefore is not a valid reason to strike an arbitration agreement.
A disallowed limitation on the remedy should result in striking the limitation from
the contract, as in litigation, not in refusing to enforce the entire arbitration agreement, as
the courts did in these cases. A penalty for not arbitrating is unenforceable under general
contract law principles prohibiting agreed damages that are penalties.215 Again, it is not
enforceable in court, either. It therefore is not a valid reason to strike an arbitration
agreement. In the penalty cases in courts, moreover, the penalty clause is stricken from
the contract, which is otherwise enforceable.216 Striking down an entire arbitration clause
due to the inclusion of such a clause is not justified under general contract law. It, too, is
a pretext.
e. Miscellaneous Reasons
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There are other reasons courts have given that do not fall into one of the above
categories. Several, nonetheless, are suspect.
In one case, the arbitration agreement provided that an employee was required to
submit its case to the employer as a condition precedent to arbitrating. The court held that
this gave the employer an unfair “peek” and rendered the arbitration agreement
substantively unconscionable.217 The court could have severed the condition precedent
without upsetting the balance in the arbitration agreement, but it did not. More important,
the employer may have had a legitimate business need for such a condition. Making the
case to the employer before starting an adversarial proceeding permits the employer (a) to
concede and take corrective or compensatory action, (b) to propose noncompulsory
methods of alternative dispute settlement, such as mediation,218 or (c) to enter into direct
settlement negotiations. Any of these events could maintain the relationship between the
two parties, which might save the employee from finding another job and the employer
from finding another employee. By not examining the plausible justifications for the
condition, the court may be reaching its conclusion without due regard for contract law
and the policy favoring arbitration.
A few other courts have been more straightforward about their prejudice. Thus,
one announced that negligence claims covered by the arbitration agreement were better
decided by a jury.219 Another held that arbitration agreements in employment contracts
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are presumptively substantively unconscionable.220 And a third will not find an
arbitration agreement enforceable unless it was concluded in a “clear and unmistakable
manner,”221 another limitation not found in general contract law and inconsistent with
Allied-Bruce.
f. Cumulative Effects
Most cases examined for this study do not find unconscionability for one and only
one of the above reasons. Two or more reasons are usually given. Consequently, it should
be considered whether the cumulative effect of several of the above reasons can make an
arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable when any one of the reasons does not
suffice. The short answer is that, logically, the whole cannot be greater than its parts.
Cumulating a number of invalid reasons cannot make out a validreason.
It is a different question, however, whether a court can cumulate a number of
valid reasons, each of which alone may have inadequate weight to tip the scales in favor
of a finding of unconscionability. The above discussion distinguishes valid from invalid
reasons, not weightier from less weighty reasons. Consequently, it would seem, many of
the decisions cited were erroneous under the law and established policy.
Conclusion
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There is a new judicial hostility to arbitration in noncommercial cases. Many
courts, when asked to enforce an arbitration agreement, seize upon the unconscionability
doctrine as a pretext to refuse enforcement. The dispute then goes to litigation despite the
parties’ agreement to arbitrate. By refusing to compel arbitration under a valid agreement,
the courts manifestly prefer litigation to arbitration. This violates the policy favoring
arbitration, which is based in the FAA § 2 and several Supreme Court precedents.

